Russia and Nixon’s Advice to Clinton

It was in February 1993, when Bill Clinton took his first steps in front of the White House. Being President of the United States at this time in history conferred the status of the most powerful person on Earth. At the end of the Cold War, the United States appeared like a colossus. Not since the days of the Roman Empire has a single state maintained a similar military advantage over other players in the system. Whereas since the height of the British Empire, no nation had exercised greater dominance in the global economy.

But the “New World Order” announced by his predecessor George HW Bush was not without danger. Housed in the Oval Office, Clinton would occupy a good part of his agenda to contain the situation in Russia. Because in the months following the dissolution of the Soviet Union In 1991, the Russian Federation would experience dizzying moments unlike any other nation of its size in recent history.

Overnight, price controls were lifted, triggering a violent surge of inflation that shattered people’s incomes and savings. And Russia has become the most extreme case of the shock doctrine. So much so that Yegor Gaidar – the “architect” of Yeltsin-era economic reforms – described the experience of taking over the Russian economy in 1992 as that of someone stepping into the cockpit of a plane at 10,000 meters and discovers that there is no one at the controls.

Meanwhile, a threat hovered over the entire system. Preventing the atomization of the Soviet nuclear arsenal has become a crucial priority. New states like Ukraine or Kazakhstan were too weak in the face of the urgency to prevent risky proliferation.

However, the end of bipolarity had led to a celebration of optimism where one would come to dream of “end of ideologiesand the promise of a clear path to universal democracy and market economy.

Without understanding this enthusiasm, Richard Nixon had warned in a note sent to Bush that remember that Russia was heir to a tradition of pride and heroism and that the collapse of the Soviet Union had dealt a devastating blow to their national pride.” The former president recommended that the government “make it clear in word and deed that it regards Russia as a suitable partner in the world affairs, with legitimate security interests”.

It was then that the young and pragmatic Clinton sought the opinion of the former president he had hated twenty years earlier about the Watergate scandal. A rehabilitated Nixon returned to the White House, where he was greeted by Clinton and his wife Hillary, eager to hear from the man who had achieved Elder Statesman status. The one who advocated the need to support the emerging Russian openness. while warned that if Yeltsin failed he would surely be replaced by a new nationalism and if so, Washington should forget about the peace dividend.

After listening to Nixon, Clinton held his first meeting with Yeltsin in Vancouver, Canada, where they renewed their vows for the promotion of democracy, security and peace. Other ads had less rhetorical content. The United States extended $1.6 trillion in credits and a high-level permanent commission was formed, consisting of Vice President Al Gore and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, known in Russia as “Mr. Fifteen Percent”.

At the G-7 summit in Tokyo, they would meet again. And other billion dollar aid package he would come to Moscow in exchange for a program of reforms and privatizations. A policy that would provoke criticism. Leslie Gelb warned in the New York Times that “throwing money into an economy that is sinking into political anarchy, waste and corruption doesn’t sound like a brilliant idea”.

Because in the midst of an internal crisis, Russia then suffered the trauma of the change in international status that followed the loss of its empire. As he resisted accepting a new geopolitical reality in which a second-order role of power was reserved for him.

NATO’s expansion into territories that once belonged to the Warsaw Pact would become the axis of differences between Moscow and the West. Freed from the Communist yoke, the nations of Eastern Europe would embrace “Euro-Atlanticism,” inevitably raising concerns in the Kremlin. As Vaclav Havel himself would explain in his book “Summer Meditations”. When he warns that from a military and strategic point of view, no country wants to be surrounded by a powerful alliance to which it does not have access.

During a moment, Yeltsin thought he was avoiding NATO expansion, but after 1996 he would feel “betrayed”. After all, on February 9, 1990, Secretary of State James Baker III assured Mikhail Gorbachev that German unification would not mean that NATO would not expand “one step” eastward.

But evoking the old adage that there is no greater distance in this world than that offered by a misunderstanding, the dispute would have decisive consequences which can be seen in the conflict which today engulfs Russia and the West. Because Despite the assurances offered, in January 1994, Clinton will recognize that “the question is not to know if NATO will have new members, but when and how it will be done”.. Even in September of that year, during a visit to the White House, Yeltsin heard Clinton say that Russia was “eligible” for NATO membership.

The facts, those true tyrants of history, have shown that The optimism of the 90s was exaggerated. Today, the Western values ​​of freedom, open economies and respect for human rights again appear to be threatened, by external factors and by the errors of their leaders.

Already in 2014, in the midst of the Crimean annexation crisis, Ian Bremmer felt that Russia could not force Ukraine to remain forever in Moscow’s orbit. But at the same time he admitted that no power, not even the most powerful of all, could prevent the Russians from giving up their efforts. The founder of the Eurasia Group anticipated that the sanctions could do long-term damage but they will not change Vladimir Putin’s way of thinking.

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