How to win the “hot war” in Ukraine and the “cold war” that will follow

After a year, there is much to cry about. The dead, on both sides. The living, scattered throughout Europe by Russian missiles. The poor of the world struggle to buy bread. But, addressing his nation this week, Vladimir Putin did not regret it.

Ukraine’s allies can take credit for doing their part to counter Putin’s ruthless onslaught, though Ukraine itself deserves the greatest credit for its courage and determination. They converged on two principles: that Ukraine must win and it is up to President Volodimir Zelensky to define what victory means. During his visit to Kyiv on Tuesday, President Joe Biden it was living proof of American commitment.

However, even the most worthy principles tend to wear thin, as Putin well knows. He thinks the West will get tired of it, and with the prospect of a new US president in 2025 and stronger support from China, he might still be right. His speech this week made it clear that he is mobilizing Russia for a war that, hot or cold, could last a generation.

In the fighting, and in the long years of heavily armed confrontation that will follow, Ukraine will prevail only when Putin – or, more likely, his successor – concludes that further aggression will seriously weaken him at home. Western leaders must show their resolve to Russia and prepare its own people for the coming confrontation. This is why they must mark the second year of combat by going beyond generalities and committing themselves to a credible plan of long-term struggle.

The first task is to understand what is at stake. Some Europeans still harbor the belief that a peace agreement could put the world back to the way it was on February 23, 2022. In fact, Russia, Ukraine and the West are locked in a competition between rival systems. The West believes that sovereign Ukraine should be free to become a prosperous and democratic nation. Putin denies the existence of Ukraine and claims that Russian civilization is at war with the West. This is a war that will test the resolve and might of both sides.

The second task is to gain an advantage on the battlefield. The Russian and Ukrainian spring offensives will show whether either side can take territory. The Russian assault has already begun and does not seem to be gaining ground. The one in Ukraine is probably in April or May. The declared objective of the Ukrainian army is restore borders of 1991 taking Crimea and the four provinces annexed by Putin in September.

You should take as many as you can. The strategic reason for this is that a lagging Ukraine would be impoverished and difficult to defend. The east and south of the country are sources of minerals and crops, and centers of industry. Unhindered access to Black Sea provides safe passage for Ukrainian exports. The political rationale is that the more territory Russian forces cede, the clearer it will become that the war was futile and the harder it will be for Putin or his successor to justify reinvading Ukraine with a new army.

Should Ukraine’s ambitions include Crimea? In principle, yes. It is located within the recognized borders of the country. Controls access to the Ukrainian coast. It is also the territory to which Putin is most attached, and therefore the liberation of which would best lead to his defeat. In practice, Crimea will be difficult to take. Putin can issue a credible threat to use nuclear weapons. Zelensky had better be sure of success: a failed assault could end up rallying ordinary Russians behind their leader.

The stronger Ukraine’s territorial position is, the stronger it will be in the Cold War after the fighting ends. It could come from a formal peace agreement, but more likely from a ceasefire, like the 70-year standoff between North and South Korea. Either way, Putin won’t just give up, so Ukraine will demand a credible guarantee of its security.

Ideally this would mean being Member of NATO. Putin is hard to dissuade because the United States does not want to start a war with Russia, and rightly so. NATO membership reduces risk by reversing Putin’s roles. It urges its members in advance to treat an attack on one country as an attack on all. If Putin invaded, he would be the one to choose a superpower war.

in the recent Munich Security Conference, several countries have declared themselves in favor, even France could be open to the idea. However, NATO membership requires consensus. If this is not feasible, Ukraine would need bilateral guarantees and lots of weapons, to make it a European Israel, too indigestible for another Russian invasion to make sense.

Whatever happens, Ukraine’s need for weapons will last at least a decade and maybe more. At present, it fires about as many shells in a month as the United States can produce in a year. Your spring (boreal) campaign needs ammunition, spare parts, air defense systems, long-range artillery and, ultimately, aircraft. After the war, a whole arsenal of NATO-grade weapons will be needed.

Politicians insist they have understood these needs, but are slow to act. They have to change their point of view. Western countries must accept that they can no longer afford peacetime levels of arms production, not only to support Ukraine but also to defend themselves. Threats abound. They need to signal long-term ammo resupply, invest in augmentation capacity, and make more acquisitions across the alliance to create a strong industry.

Western powers can also signal their commitment to multi-year budgets for financial support. This is important because if the Ukrainian economy does not prosper, democracy will not prosper either. Gradually, the country’s defenses will weaken.

Help is essential, of course. Since the United States supplied most of the weapons, a large part is expected to come from Europe. But private capital is also essentialand he will only go to Ukraine if it is considered a good place to invest.

As in Israel and South Korea, which have prospered despite the hostility of their neighbors for decades, Ukraine’s greatest resource is its people. Throughout this war, they showed that they were enterprising and creative. It is vital that once the fighting is over, the women and children who have fled to the west do not stay put, but choose to join their partners.

And Ukraine must overcome a history of corruption and political capture. Here the promise of EU membership can help. The membership process is a sanitary regimen for the institutions of a country. As long as Ukraine’s candidacy is treated in good faith by EU members, it could be transformative. Formal membership negotiations are expected to start in 2023.

As the war enters its second year, some wonder if Ukraine is worth all the effort. Isn’t the cost of living crisis more urgent? Or climate change? Imagine if money spent on weapons could fund development instead.

It is right to regret the war, but it is unwise to simply wish that Putin’s aggression would go away. A Russian victory in Ukraine would send the world down a dark path where power is right and borders are drawn by violence. This may hasten the next, even worse, confrontation in Europe. And that would deepen the widespread feeling that Western power and the universal values ​​it defends are in sharp decline.

Ukraine’s victory, on the other hand, would bring hope that a sovereign democracy need not bow to its much larger dictatorial neighbour. It would be a world that would come to life thanks to the determination and courage of Mr. Zelensky and the Ukrainian people.

© 2023, The Economist Newspaper Limited. All rights reserved.

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